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Security model

EdgeFetch fetches URLs that come from AI agents, which makes those URLs untrusted input. The main risk is server-side request forgery (SSRF): tricking a worker into reaching your LAN, a cloud metadata endpoint or your Home Assistant.

  • The URL must use https, have a multi-label DNS host, and contain no IP literals, localhost or user:pass@.
  • The resolved IP is checked inside the dialer, right before connect(). This blocks DNS-rebinding tricks where a name resolves to a public IP at check time and a private one at connect time.
  • Blocked ranges include loopback, RFC 1918, CGNAT and Tailscale (100.64.0.0/10), link-local and cloud metadata (169.254.0.0/16), ULA, and IPv6 transition prefixes.
  • Redirects are followed by hand, up to 5 hops, and every hop is checked again.

Browser sandboxing, network proxy & VLAN guidance

Section titled “Browser sandboxing, network proxy & VLAN guidance”
  • OS process sandbox: On Windows and macOS, Headless Chromium runs with its native OS process sandbox enabled (browserSandbox: "on"). On Linux containers where NO_NEW_PRIVS or disabled user namespaces prevent Chromium’s namespace sandbox, EdgeFetch probes sandbox startup once, falls back only when required, and reports browserSandbox: "on" | "off" and browserVersion in list_agents (with optional EDGEFETCH_REQUIRE_BROWSER_SANDBOX=1 enforcement).
  • Subresource proxy & WebRTC guard: Chromium runs with every subresource forced through an in-process loopback proxy (--proxy-server=http://127.0.0.1:<port>, --proxy-bypass-list=<-loopback>, --host-resolver-rules="MAP * ~NOTFOUND , EXCLUDE 127.0.0.1", --webrtc-ip-handling-policy=disable_non_proxied_udp, and --enforce-webrtc-ip-permission-check). Caller extra headers are attached per-request strictly to the initial target hostname via CDP Fetch.enable.
  • Home network isolation: Because browser and PDF worker nodes run untrusted JavaScript and native document parsers, place home browser-v1 / pdf-v1 nodes on an isolated VLAN or guest network (and a standard non-admin user on Windows) so even an unpatched browser bug cannot reach LAN devices. Child processes run with a scrubbed environment, locked-down /data (0700 0:0), and PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0.
  • Containers run as non-root 65532:65532, with no-new-privileges and an AppArmor profile in the Home Assistant add-on.
  • On Linux the add-on drops to UID 65532 on every OS thread before opening any socket.
  • One external Go dependency. The hub has zero npm runtime dependencies.
  • Dependabot watches Go modules, npm and GitHub Actions. govulncheck runs in CI.
  • Releases are signed and attested. See Verify a release.

Please report privately through GitHub Security Advisories, not in a public issue. The full threat model is in SECURITY.md.